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The Jury Trial and Remedy Clauses 
hank you so much for the kind introduction—that’s so kind of 
you. It’s really an honor and a great pleasure to be with you this 
morning. I believe that the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in 
Horton v. Oregon Health and Science University reflects much 
greater ambivalence about the jury trial in civil cases.1 And that’s 
what I’d like to talk about this morning, but I want to focus on maybe 
three points. First, at the time the Constitution was written, this 
thought that the right to jury trial in civil and criminal cases was 
regarded as equally important. Second, I want to talk about how that’s 
not been so, and certainly [not] in recent decades. And third, I want to 
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1 Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 359 Or. 168, 376 P.3d 998 (2016). 
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offer some thoughts as to why this has happened. But this, then, is the 
context the other panelists are going to talk about more generally: the 
right to jury trial in states across the country and then talk about how 
this all comes back to Horton and what it means here in Oregon. 
So, let me then start by talking about the understanding of jury 
trials in civil and criminal cases from the earliest days of the country. 
It’s interesting, if you even go back beyond American history, the 
right to jury trial in civil and criminal cases was treated much the 
same. You can trace the jury trial in civil and criminal cases back to 
Greek society, to Roman law. In the year 1215, King Henry II created 
a right to jury trial in land use cases, in the same year the Magna 
Carta was issued. And the Magna Carta very clearly provided for a 
right to jury trial in criminal and civil cases.2 The way in which juries 
were thought of in England or in the Middle Ages is vastly different 
than it is today. But still it was described by Blackstone as one of the 
most important rights that existed.3 It’s interesting that the Oregon 
Supreme Court in its decision in Horton quotes Blackstone and tries 
to talk about, well, what did Blackstone really mean when he spoke so 
glowingly of the crucial importance of the right to jury trial in civil 
cases?4  
In the United States, you can find the first declaration of the right 
to jury trial in civil cases in Virginia in 1624. Virtually all of the 
colonies, in their charters and in their constitutions, had provisions 
that provided jury trials in civil and criminal cases. The drafting of the 
Constitution in Philadelphia in 1787 also had a focus on jury trials in 
criminal and civil cases. Article III of the Constitution specifically 
mentions the right to jury trial in criminal cases,5 but there was 
concern that there wasn’t a comparable provision in the text of the 
Constitution with regard to civil juries. And so, on September 12, 
1787, five days before the Constitutional Convention concluded, one 
of the delegates, Hugh Williamson, objected to the absence of a 
provision with regard to civil jury trials. This was truly the eleventh 
hour for the Constitutional Convention. Those who were present were 
tired; it was a long, hot summer in Philadelphia, [and] they didn’t 
want to take up additional issues, so they felt that this could be dealt 
with later, especially by legislation. But one of the key arguments—
perhaps the most prominently expressed objection to the ratification 
 
2 See Horton, 359 Or. at 175, 376 P.3d at 1004. 
3 See id. at 236, 376 P.3d at 1036. 
4 See id. at 236–43, 376 P.3d at 1036−40. 
5 U.S. CONST. art. III. 
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of the Constitution—was the absence of an assurance of civil jury 
trials. 
I went back and found some of the quotes from the framers at the 
time. The anti-federalists, especially, were using this as a basis for 
trying to convince the state ratifying conventions not to approve of 
the drafted Constitution. Richard Henry Lee, in 1787, said, “Trial by 
jury in civil cases, and trial by jury in criminal cases, stand on the 
same footing. They are common rights of Americans.” Alexander 
Hamilton dedicated one of the Federalist Papers, we now know as 
Federalist No. 83, to explaining why the Constitution should be 
interpreted as being consistent with the right to jury trial in civil 
cases.6 The argument was that since the right to jury trial in criminal 
cases was mentioned in Article III, but the right to jury trial in civil 
cases wasn’t mentioned, this silence could be seen as disparaging, or 
even denying, the right. Hamilton denied that [argument].7 Hamilton 
said it was simply left to the legislatures to provide for jury trials in 
civil cases, and it can be expected that they would do so.8 
As you know, many of the states approved the Constitution, but on 
the condition that a Bill of Rights be drafted. And it was clear from 
the outset that this Bill of Rights would include a provision with 
regard to civil jury trials. Let me quote James Madison from the time: 
“Trial by jury in civil cases is essential to secure the liberty of the 
people as any one of the preexistent rights of nature.” 
The Constitution has the right to jury trial in criminal cases in the 
Sixth Amendment,9 and with regard to civil jury trials it’s in the 
Seventh Amendment,10 but you can find many statements from the 
late eighteenth, early nineteenth centuries saying that these were 
regarded as rights that were comparable in every way. 
Joseph Story wrote his famous Commentaries on the Constitution 
in 1833.11 They were both seen as a reflection on the understanding of 
the Constitution, but also they were tremendously influential for 
decades to come. Story was quite explicit that the right to jury trial in 
civil cases and the right to jury trial in criminal cases were equally 
 
6 THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
10 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
11 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S. (Thomas 
Cooley ed., 4th ed. 1873) (1833). 
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important.12 And again, let me quote Story. He said, “[T]he 
inestimable privilege of [a] trial by jury in civil cases . . . is conceded 
by all to be an essential political and civil liberty.”13 He wrote, “[It is] 
a privilege scarcely inferior to that in criminal cases, which is 
conceded by all to be essential to political and civil liberty.”14 
If you go back to the time of the framing, [and] if you read Story’s 
Commentaries, you can see that the same concerns inspired the desire 
to protect civil juries and criminal juries. There was a desire to 
democratize decision making. There was a great fear of government, 
and it was seen that juries in civil and criminal cases were a key check 
on government power. There was also a thought that this was a way to 
educate people, to have them be involved in civic governance. Alexis 
de Tocqueville, in his famous work Democracy in America in the 
nineteenth century, spoke of juries in exactly this way.15 
Well, this brings me to my second point. That’s not how the law 
has developed. There is no doubt that the right to jury trial in criminal 
cases is regarded as more important than the right to jury trial in civil 
cases. Indeed, the right to jury trial in criminal cases has been called a 
fundamental right, but that label isn’t used with regard to the right to 
jury trial in civil cases under the Seventh Amendment. You see this 
most clearly with regard to the fact that the Sixth Amendment right to 
jury trial in criminal cases has been applied to state and local 
governments through the process of incorporation, but the Seventh 
Amendment right to jury trial hasn’t been applied through the process 
of incorporation. 
As you know, when the Constitution was written, it was thought 
that the Bill of Rights would apply only to the federal government. 
The Supreme Court in Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 
in 1833, said that it was understood by everyone that the Bill of 
Rights was meant as a limit on federal power, not as a limit on state 
and local power.16 And that made sense at the time, when it was 
thought that state constitutions would adequately protect people from 
state government abuses. The Bill of Rights was necessary to protect 
people from federal abuses. This all changes after the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, but it especially changes with regard 
 
12 See 2 id. at 523−44. 
13 2 id. at 526. 
14 Id. 
15 See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Daniel C. 
Gilman ed., 1898) (1835). 
16 Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 32 U.S. 243, 248 (1833). 
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to the late nineteenth century, when the Supreme Court began to 
apply the Bill of Rights to the states through the process of 
incorporation. The Supreme Court, beginning in the 1890s, said that 
the word “liberty” in the Due Process Clause protects fundamental 
rights from state and local interference.17 The Supreme Court said 
among those rights protected as fundamental are those that can be 
deemed in the Bill of Rights to be fundamental.18 So, the Supreme 
Court said, included within “liberty” are rights not enumerated that 
are fundamental, but also included, incorporated in the liberty of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, are those provisions in the Bill of Rights that 
are deemed fundamental.19 It wasn’t until 1925, in Gitlow v. New 
York, that the Supreme Court first said that freedom of speech under 
the First Amendment was incorporated and applied to state and local 
governments.20 It wasn’t until Powell v. Alabama in 1932, the 
infamous Scottsboro Trials, that the Supreme Court said that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel in criminal cases applied in capital 
cases.21 Of course, it wasn’t until 1963, in Gideon v. Wainwright, that 
the Supreme Court said that the right to counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment applies in any criminal case where there’s a potential 
prison sentence.22 It wasn’t until 1968, in Duncan v. Louisiana, that 
the Supreme Court said that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial is 
fundamental and must be applied to state governments.23 But, this has 
never happened with regard to the Seventh Amendment right to jury 
trial in civil cases. Never has the Supreme Court said that it’s to be 
regarded as fundamental as applied to state and local governments. 
Actually, one of the very first cases about the application of the 
Bill of Rights to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment 
involved the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial in civil cases. In 
Walker v. Sauvinet, in 1875, the Supreme Court rejected the argument 
that the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial in civil cases applies to 
state courts.24 In 1931, in Hardware v. Glidden, the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed that the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial doesn’t 
 
17 See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897). 
18 See id. 
19 See id. at 590. 
20 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 667 (1925). 
21 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932). 
22 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342−43(1963). 
23 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148–49 (1968). 
24 Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 (1875). 
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apply to state courts.25 As recently as 2010, in McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, the Supreme Court repeated that the Seventh Amendment 
right to jury trial in civil cases has never been incorporated.26 That 
case involved whether the Second Amendment right to bear arms 
applies to state and local governments.27 From 1791, when the 
Second Amendment was ratified, until 2008, when the Supreme Court 
decided District of Columbia v. Heller,28 the Court had never struck 
down any law—federal, state, or local—for violating the Second 
Amendment. In Heller, the Supreme Court said that the Second 
Amendment right to bear arms at least protects the right of individuals 
to have guns in their homes for the sake of security.29 That case 
involved a part of the federal government—the District of 
Columbia.30 There was no occasion for the Supreme Court to 
consider then whether it would apply to state and local governments. 
Quickly, the Supreme Court took up that issue. Two years later in 
McDonald, the Supreme Court said the Second Amendment is 
incorporated and should be deemed fundamental.31 Justice Alito 
wrote for the Court. It’s a plurality opinion, and in the opinion, Justice 
Alito said that there are four provisions of the Bill of Rights that have 
never been deemed to apply to state and local governments.32 One is 
the Third Amendment right to not have soldiers quartered in a 
person’s home.33 Now, I have no doubt that if a state government 
forced people to house soldiers the Third Amendment would be 
deemed incorporated, but there’s never been such a case before the 
Supreme Court. The Fifth Amendment right to grand jury indictment 
in criminal cases—in fact, this goes back to a late nineteenth-century 
Supreme Court decision that said the Fifth Amendment right to grand 
jury indictment doesn’t apply in states.34 And I think here too this 
reflects an ambivalence about the role of the grand jury. The grand 
jury, which was thought of as a limit on state power, as a check on 
prosecutorial abuses, hasn’t functioned that way. And so the Supreme 
Court has not found the occasion to apply the Fifth Amendment right 
 
25 Hardware Dealers’ Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 160 (1931). 
26 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 867 (2010). 
27 See id. at 742. 
28 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
29 Id. at 628. 
30 See id. 
31 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 749. 
32 See id. at 765. 
33 Id. at 765 n.13. 
34 Id. 
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to grand jury indictment to state courts. There is the Eighth 
Amendment right against excessive fines that the Supreme Court, in 
1989 in Browning Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal,35 said it never 
ruled whether this applied to the states. And finally, the court 
indicated that the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial in civil cases 
has never been deemed incorporated.36 
Now, this is one way of thinking of how the Supreme Court has 
treated the Seventh Amendment differently than the Sixth 
Amendment with regard to their provisions with regard to jury trial. 
The Sixth Amendment is explicitly deemed a fundamental right. The 
failure to incorporate the Seventh Amendment means it’s explicitly 
deemed not to be a fundamental right. But it’s more than that, too. 
Over recent years, you can find many Supreme Court cases expanding 
and enforcing the right to jury trial in criminal cases. You’ll be hard-
pressed to find comparable cases with regard to the Seventh 
Amendment right to jury trial in civil cases. I point, for example, to 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey37 in 2000—
from a practical perspective, one of the most important Supreme 
Court decisions in the last two decades. There, the Supreme Court 
said that any factor other than a prior conviction that leads to a 
sentence greater than the statutory maximum must be a proven to a 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.38 It was on the basis of this that, five 
year later, in United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court held that the 
sentencing guidelines of the federal courts must only be advisory.39 
They can’t be mandatory because it has to be that any factor other 
than a prior conviction that leads to sentence greater than the statutory 
maximum has to be proven to the jury. The Supreme Court’s decision 
in Apprendi, and all the cases that have followed Apprendi, very 
much emphasize the role of the jury and the need to preserve and 
protect that role in criminal cases. Yet you don’t find comparable 
decision with regard to the right to jury trial in civil cases. And so I do 
see the ambivalence which I described at the beginning with regard to 
jury trials in civil cases. 
Well that then brings me to the final part of my remarks. Why? 
Why is there the exalting of the role of the jury in criminal cases and 
 
35 Browning Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257 (1989); see McDonald, 561 
U.S. at 765 n.13. 
36 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 765 n.13. 
37 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
38 Id. at 466−67. 
39 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 221 (2005). 
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the ambivalence of the role of the jury in civil cases? Because I do 
believe, as I said at the beginning, that the Oregon Supreme Court’s 
decision in Horton reflects this ambivalence.40 Well, let me offer 
some explanations, but as to each let me also suggest that it’s not very 
persuasive. 
One explanation is there is a significant limit with regard to jury 
trials in civil cases in the Seventh Amendment that doesn’t exist with 
regard to the Sixth Amendment. The Seventh Amendment says that, 
as to matters at common law, there would be a right to a jury trial. 
Back in 1812, Justice Story, sitting as a Circuit Justice, said that what 
this means is there’d be a right to a jury trial in matters that would be 
seen as going to a court of law, but there wouldn’t be a right to a jury 
trial in matters that’d be seen as going to a court of equity. And even 
then the court that was going to be originalist would say this is all 
decided on the basis of what would have gone to a court of law at the 
time the Constitution was written, as opposed to a court of equity at 
the time the Constitution was written. The Oregon Supreme Court in 
the Horton decision emphasizes the need to look to what was the law 
in terms of the right to jury trial at the time the Oregon Constitution, 
and specifically its provisions with regard to the right to jury trial, 
were adopted.41 
This distinction between courts of law and courts of equity has 
long been repudiated. The United States government saw in the 
nineteenth century a merger of law and equity. No longer at the state 
court, in almost any jurisdiction, do you see a difference between 
courts of law and courts of equity. Federal courts don’t have that, and 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make clear that in civil cases in 
federal court there is one action.42 And yet the law persists to this day 
that whether a jury trial is available is based on whether it would have 
gone to a court of law (and essentially be a matter of money damages) 
or go to a court of equity (and be about injunctive relief). It’s worth 
thinking about whether this distinction makes sense. Of course, seen 
as being written into the Seventh Amendment, it’s been embedded in 
constitutional decisions since 1812. But why this distinction? Well, 
perhaps one argument is it’s in the difference in the nature of 
remedies. Well, obviously both actions at law and actions at equity 
involve fact finding. Why couldn’t the jury do the fact finding for 
 
40 See Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 359 Or. 168, 376 P.3d 998 (2016). 
41 Id. 
42 FED. R. CIV. P. 2. 
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both cases of law and cases of equity? It doesn’t seem to be any 
different with regard to that. 
So, the answer would have to be that there’s something different in 
the nature of the remedies—that juries are particularly well suited 
with regard to damages, but they’re not very well suited when it 
comes to equity. But why would that be? Equity, ultimately, as we’ve 
all learned, is about balancing competing considerations—that’s 
where the phrase “balancing the equities” comes from. Why are juries 
ill suited to balancing the equities? Why are they less suited for that 
than anything else that we ask juries to do? We rely on juries to 
determine who or what is the reasonable person. Isn’t that really, 
ultimately, a balancing of competing considerations? Well, perhaps 
it’s the notion that an injunction often involves restraining liberty, 
whereas damages are about money. And maybe we care much more 
about liberty than we care about money and that would explain the 
difference. But that doesn’t explain the distinction between the Sixth 
and the Seventh Amendments. The Sixth Amendment is all about 
taking away somebody’s liberty, even taking away somebody’s life. 
We entrust the jury with regard to this, so why wouldn’t we want to 
entrust the jury with regard to matters of liberty under the Seventh 
Amendment? In fact, if we regard liberty as more important than 
money, wouldn’t that argue for an even larger role for the jury? So 
does the distinction between law and equity really make any sense 
other than the fact that it was written in the Seventh Amendment and 
part of the law for so long? 
I think there’s another explanation for the ambivalence, and this 
has been the attack on the jury in civil cases. I think there has been an 
attack on the jury, and we find this in the form of criticism of large 
jury verdicts—the McDonald’s hot coffee case is often pointed to as 
exemplary of this.43 You find the argument by anecdote prominent in 
this regard. You hear the stories of the runaway jury. And you have a 
sense that what businesses would prefer, whether it’s a suit by 
consumers or employees, is to take the case away from the jury and 
the passions of the jury. 
Well, there’s many problems with this. As I’m sure we’ll talk about 
over the course of the day, study after study has shown that the 
runaway jury is a myth. Large damage judgments by juries rarely 
happen, and when they do they’re quite explainable by the facts. Also, 
 
43 See Liebeck v. McDonald’s Rests. P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309, 
at *1 (D. N.M. Aug. 18, 1994). 
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there is a check that exists in every jurisdiction, and that’s remittitur. 
It is the ability of the judge to be able to provide some kind of limit 
with regard [to] a jury verdict that seems inappropriate given the 
facts. Also, it seems strange to say because we don’t like the 
perceived result, we’re therefore going to limit the constitutional 
right. This isn’t accepted in other areas of constitutional law. Why 
should it be here? 
But I do believe that the ambivalence about the jury in civil cases 
reflects this attack on the jury that we’ve had over several decades. 
And I think the Horton decision reflects that as well. 
Finally, I think, in terms of the ambivalence of the jury, there’s the 
growth of alternative dispute resolution. An enormously important 
development in the law in the last several decades has been taking 
cases out of the courts in the civil arena and having them shifted to 
arbitration or other forms of alternative dispute resolution. Now, I 
don’t object to this when it’s two large companies that voluntarily 
agree they want to submit their dispute to arbitration. My concern is 
all of the places where arbitration clauses exist in form contracts and 
take people away from their ability to get to court and to have a jury 
trial. And you see this in so many places. I think one of the key cases 
was the Supreme Court’s decision over a decade and a half ago in 
Circuit City v. Adams.44 It involved a man by the name of Saint Clair 
Adams.45 He had applied for a job at Circuit City.46 (And now I have 
to explain to my students what Circuit City was. [Audience laughter.]) 
Literally on the back of his employment application in quite small 
print is language that said that in any dispute that it would have to go 
to arbitration; he couldn’t go to court.47 After working at Circuit City 
for a couple years, he filed a suit in California state court, entirely 
under state law, for employment discrimination.48 But Circuit City 
filed an action in federal court under the Federal Arbitration Act to 
have that contractual provision enforced.49 Now, strangely, they 
called small print on the back of an employment application a 
contractual provision.50 But the Supreme Court, in a five to four 
decision, split along ideological lines, said that the case had to go to 
 
44 Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
45 Id. at 109. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 109–10. 
48 Id. at 110. 
49 Id. 
50 See id. at 124. 
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arbitration—that Saint Clair Adams couldn’t go to state court.51 He 
couldn’t get a jury trial that otherwise would have been available to 
him in state court.52 And, in case after case, the Supreme Court has 
enforced arbitration clauses even as a form contract. 
I think another case which is quite significant, and this is AT&T 
Mobility v. Concepcion.53 Here, the Concepcions, a married couple, 
saw an ad from AT&T advertising free cell phones for those who 
signed up for its services.54 They, like all of us, signed an agreement. 
They, probably like most of us, didn’t read the agreement they were 
signing. They were surprised when they got their first monthly 
statement for $32.88 that was for sales tax; they thought since AT&T 
was advertising free cell phones it would pay the sales tax.55 They 
wanted to be part of a class action suit against AT&T.56 But in the 
agreement they signed was a clause that said that any dispute with 
AT&T would have to go to arbitration, not go to court.57 The 
California Supreme Court in the Discover Bank case had said that 
such arbitration clauses in routine consumer contracts are not 
enforceable.58 It said they’re contracts of adhesion.59 But the United 
States Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, reversed the Ninth 
Circuit and said that the Concepcions would have to go to 
arbitration.60 Justice Scalia’s majority opinion (the Court was 
ideologically divided) talked about the ill-effects of class actions.61 It 
talked about the terrorizing effects of class actions on businesses, 
forcing them to settle nonmeritorious claims.62 And I think there is an 
implicit criticism of the jury there. As a result, arbitration clauses are 
increasingly ubiquitous. They’re in employment contracts. They’re in 
consumer contracts. They’re even in medical contracts. 
Not long ago I went to see a new eye doctor for the first time, and I 
was given a big stack of papers to fill out. In the middle was a form I 
 
51 See id. 
52 See id. 
53 AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
54 Id. at 337. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 336–37. 
58 Id. at 340; see also Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005), 
abrogated by Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 340. 
59 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 346–47. 
60 Id. at 352. 
61 See id. at 350–52. 
62 Id. at 350. 
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was asked to sign: that if I have any claims against the doctor arising 
out the treatment, I agreed I would not be able to sue the doctor. I’d 
have to go to arbitration. I asked the receptionist if the doctor would 
still see me if I didn’t sign. She said she didn’t know; nobody had 
ever asked her that question before. I now know of many doctors who 
will not see patients unless they sign waivers of going to court—
arbitration agreements—which means they will never get to go before 
a jury. 
Around the same time, I bought a new Dell computer. As you 
know, in order to use a computer and an iPad, you have to click that 
you’ve read the terms and agree to it. For the iPad, they’re forty-six 
single-spaced pages long. I usually just click “Agree” and use the 
machine. Well, I decided to read the terms on my new Dell computer. 
Sure enough, there was a clause that said if I had any disputes with 
Dell arising out of the computer, I agreed I could not sue them, but I’d 
have to go to arbitration. In other words, I was giving up my right to a 
jury trial. I wrote Dell a letter saying I did not agree to that clause, 
and by opening the envelope of my letter they agreed I could sue 
them in court if we had a dispute. [Audience laughter.] Dell did not 
write back. 
But I do think that the great growth in arbitration, as I’ve 
described, has contributed to the ambivalence with regard to the civil 
jury. But now juxtapose that with regard to the Sixth Amendment. In 
federal court, about ninety-five percent of all cases are resolved by a 
guilty plea. If you look across the country, to the state courts, it’s 
quite similar to that as well.63 We don’t value the right to jury trial in 
criminal cases less because almost all criminal cases are resolved 
through this form of alternative dispute resolution. Why should we do 
so with regard to civil cases? 
So, if I’ve convinced you that the right to jury trial in civil cases 
should be as important as that in criminal cases, that we don’t treat it 
the same, and have offered some thoughts as to why, I think that does 
set the stage for the discussion today. I think some of the discussion 
that needs to be thought of is: how do we persuade the Supreme Court 
to take the Seventh Amendment more seriously and consider 
incorporating the Seventh Amendment? But until that happens, the 
right to jury trial in state courts is entirely a function of state 
constitutions. And that’s why Horton is so important. That’s why it’s 
crucial here in Oregon with regard to the right to jury trial in civil 
 
63 Id. 
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cases, but it’s also why, as other courts around the country look at 
Horton, it’s going to be important to explain why the Oregon 
Supreme Court was mistaken, and why it’s not taking this basic 
fundamental constitutional right seriously enough. 
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